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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the role of individuals‟ education, socio-economic status, and 
income on migration from Senegal to Europe. Our main hypothesis is that selectivity of 
migrants is to a large extent the result of different employment probabilities at 
destination, according to skills. The intermediate or positive selectivity (with respect to 
the source population) often found in migration studies will then reflect the inadequacy 
of the skills of important fractions of the sending countries‟ population to the 
requirements of labor markets of receiving countries. We use life course data from the 
survey «Migrations between Africa and Europe», which includes data on migrants, non 
migrants and returned migrants, surveyed in Senegal, France, Italy and Spain. Our 
results from event history models confirm the strong positive selection of Senegalese 
migrants to Europe. Consistently with our hypothesis, predicted earnings in Europe 
(accounting for the selectivity of migration) for low educated individuals falls below 
minimum wages in Europe.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
A consistent finding of the literature is the strong selectivity of migrants according to 
their skills. Clearly, migrants‟ socio-economic integration in the receiving societies if 
determined by their skills, and even they affect the situation of their descendants. For 
sending countries, who leaves is also a crucial matter, as it influence economic growth 
and social development. Given its relevance, it is surprising that the number of 
empirical analyses that assess migrant selectivity with respect to the origin country is 
extremely scarce. This is particularly true with respect to Sub-Saharan Africa migration 
flows, for which very little information is available. Only a handful of studies analyze 
migration from these countries to European destinations, in spite of the recent rise of 
these flows and its high potential for future development. Furthermore, existing 
theoretical insights are clearly insufficient to satisfactorily explain migration selectivity. 
Perhaps the most well known and better theoretically grounded model of migration 
selectivity is the one developed by Borjas (1987). That model focuses on the expected 
income gains that individuals may obtain by geographical relocation and on the levels 
of inequality on the income distributions in the countries involved. His reasoning leads 
to expect a negative selection in the traits of migrants from most developing nations 
heading to developed nations. However, many analysts have emphasized several flaws 
of the relative income differentials approach to explain migration streams, and that often 
(albeit not always) migration selectivity from developing to developed countries is 
positive with respect to such characteristics as educational level, wealth, health, or even 
psychological traits as motivation or risk proneness behavior. The role of the costs that 
immigrants must face has often been emphasized to explain these inconsistent findings, 
including the difficult access to credit by the poorest (Stark, 1991)
 1
.    
 
This paper contributes to the existing literature on migrants‟ selectivity in two ways. 
First, we propose a simple model of migration selectivity, which is based on the role of 
labor market functioning, in particular in the receiving countries, and emphasizes the 
role of the skills distribution in the sending and receiving countries. We argue that 
migration decisions of potential immigrants take into account employment opportunities 
in the destination country. In contexts characterized by a limited availability of jobs and 
skills-based job competition, as in most west European countries, unskilled labor is 
crowded out of the labor market into unemployment (for native workers) and is 
effectively hampered from immigration, as relatively low skilled individuals have to 
face low employment opportunities. One of the implications from this framework is that 
the relatively low migration propensities from low income countries may not be due 
solely to poverty, but to the inadequacy of the skills with respect to the needs of 
advanced economies of large fractions of the population in those countries (but 
increasing educational levels in developing countries may change this picture). 
 
A second contribution of the paper is the empirical investigation of Senegalese 
migration to France, Italy and Spain in the last few decades. We conduct event history 
analyses with life course data from the survey “Migrations between Africa and Europe” 
(MAFE-Senegal), conducted in 2008. Our results show a clear positive selectivity of 
migration according to several indicators of skills and resources. Furthermore, the 
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 Other approaches also lead to expect a generally positive selection of migrants, such as those 
emphasizing the expansion of  “human capabilities” in parallel with economic and social development 
(De Haas 2010, based on the work of Sen,1997, 1999).  Conversely, from the “relative deprivation” 
hypothesis of migration, one would expect negative selection of migrants (Stark, 1991). 
results from the analyses on expected income differentials are inconsistent with the 
Borjas‟ model.  
 
 
Individual’s skills and migration selectivity 
 
Income distribution      
The standard economic model of migration assumes that the migration decision is 
determined by a comparison of earnings opportunities across countries, net of migration 
costs (Sjaastad, 1962). Following this income maximization hypothesis Borjas (1987, 
1989) developed a model of migration selectivity that takes into account measured as 
well as unmeasured characteristics of individuals.  He shows that in countries with 
relatively high returns to skill and earnings inequality with respect to the prospective 
destination country, migrants tend to be negatively selected: they are drawn primarily 
from the lower half of the skill distribution in their home country. For instance, this will 
be the case for much of the developing World migration to the USA.  By contrast, in 
countries with low returns to skill and low wage dispersion, as appears to be the case in 
western Europe with respect to the USA, there will be positive selection of immigrants. 
In his analyses “the quality of immigrants in the United States then depends entirely on 
the ratio of variances in the income distributions of the United States and the country of 
origin” Borjas (1987). We may add that these results depend on assuming that migration 
costs are constant across individuals. 
According to this model, we should find negative selection in African-Europe migration 
flows, because the earnings dispersion is larger in Sub Saharan Africa. This opportunity 
set implies that low-income workers have much greater incentives to migrate than high-
income workers, and thus leads to migrants being negatively selected from the origin 
population.  
 
Migration costs  
However, this framework has to be modified to account for the costs of migration (Fini 
and Venturini, 2010; Orrenius and Zavodny, 2005). According to Fini and Venturini: “in 
a relatively poor sending country, an increase in income will have a positive impact on the 
propensity to migrate, even if we control for the income differential with the receiving 
country, because the financial constraint of the poorest become less binding”. In an study 
on Mexican-USA migration, Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) show that, if Borjas‟ 
assumption of constant migration costs across skill levels is modified so that low 
educated individuals have higher costs, intermediate or positive selection may result. 
These authors consider costs associated with the migration process itself, i.e. 
“bureaucratic requirements” to access USA, costs of admission process, transportation 
costs, and borrowing costs. Migration costs may be a substantial constraint on the 
decision to move (e.g. Schiff, 1994). Furthermore, capital markets imperfections may 
prevent a potential migrant from contracting a loan to pay from the monetary costs of 
migration (Stark, 1991).  
 
Job competition and skill distributions 
In the literature that analyzes labor market dynamics and skills two models are often 
opposed: the wage competition model and the job competition model. The basic 
assumption of the first model is that wages represent worker‟s productivity and that they 
react to shifts in the supply and demand.  In a job competition model productivity is a 
characteristic of the jobs existing in the economy, and job vacancies are filled according 
to a job queue (Thurow, 1975, 1979). In real economies probably both types of 
competition exits, but the existence of high unemployment and wage rigidities in many 
developed countries suggest that job competition predominates, especially in West 
European countries
2
. Our explanation of migrant selectivity brings together some traits 
of the job competition model of labor market functioning with the distributions of skills 
in the origin and destination countries. Here we will analyze the consequences for 
migration selectivity of these two set of factors and derive some hypotheses, that we 
believe better fit the stylized facts observed in migration studies
3
.  
 
The job competition model entails two characteristics: a) the existence of a limited 
number of jobs, and b) these jobs are sorted according to the skills they require. 
Individuals competing for these jobs also form a queue, their relative position being 
determined by their qualifications and several other characteristics, such as education, 
job experience, age, sex, ethnicity, etc. These characteristics determine or signal 
unobserved abilities of the “preferred” workers, as they influence training costs. As 
Thurow (1975) states in his theory of the labor queue, one of the most important 
characteristics to increase employment opportunities is the level of education. A high 
level of education and the related skill level will allow to access a wider number of 
potential job offers, enter the queue at the highest possible position, involving higher 
income and, crucially, will allow to shorten the duration of unemployment. The process 
of job competition may involve that high educated individuals are employed in jobs that 
used to be occupied by people with a lower level of education. This phenomenon is 
often referred as “overeducation”, and may actually imply an under utilization of skills, 
or may be a consequence of a general upgrading of the skills needed in advanced 
economies (Borgahns and Grip, 2000). Hence, relatively unskilled labor is crowded out 
of the labor market into unemployment
4
.  
 
A third element involved in our explanation of migration selectivity between a 
particular pair of countries is the distribution of skills in each of the labor markets. Each 
individual from Origin country is potentially located in the labor queue of Destination 
country in a given position. However, a portion of individuals, -the least skilled,- from 
Origin may find themselves unemployed if they were to migrate to Destination country, 
because  their skills are lower than the minimum required to successfully compete in the 
Destination labor market. This is particularly likely if the median skills in Origin are 
much lower than in Destination, as is frequently the case in many less developed 
countries with respect to more developed countries. Individuals with low skills would 
then face very low employment probabilities at destination, and as a consequence they 
will not migrate
5
. Thus, a critical period for the (potential) migrants is the time of arrival 
to the Destination labor market, when they can rely only on the skills, earnings and 
other resources brought from home, and often they cannot access unemployment 
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 It is also consistent to  relatively small effects of  the increase of foreign workers on wages, often found 
in the literature. 
3
 Among these stylized facts we can mention, the “overeducation” of migrant workers and the generally 
positive or intermediate selection by education level found in most migration streams from developing 
countries to developed countries. 
4
 Such process is often used to explain the dramatic rise in unemployment among unskilled workers in 
many European countries. 
5
 Low employment probabilities imply long expected unemployment duration in the destination country, 
that can be regarded as an increase in the costs of migration. In addition, low skilled individuals are likely 
to have less resources to cope with long unemployment periods. 
benefits or other forms of subsidization of job search
6
. Continuing with the typical case 
where the median skills in Origin are lower than in Destination, from the job 
competition at Destination it is expected that the better the skills of individuals from 
Origin, the higher their job opportunities and earnings at Destination. Furthermore, from 
job competition at Origin
7
, one would expect for the least skilled to have higher 
incentives to leave than the highly skilled, because the former have worse job positions 
and they may even be unemployed, while the latter have the better job positions. 
However, since the low skilled have very little job chances at Destination, intermediate 
or positive selection of migrants may result. In general, the wider the differential 
between a pair of countries in the distribution of skills, the higher the selectivity of 
migration (with respect to the origin country). The skills needed for the entry level 
positions in the Destination labor market will determine the minimum level of skills 
required to successfully compete in that labor market, thus directly affecting the 
composition of migrant workers. Destination countries with a relatively high level 
requirements will have better skilled migrants than countries requiring a lower level of 
skills to access its labor market.  
 
A different migration selectivity may result if the median skills of the population are 
clearly higher and the dispersion is lower in the Origin country with respect to the 
Destination country. In such a case individuals from Origin will have relatively high  
employment opportunities at Destination, and if they were to migrate this may lead to 
unemployment or a worsening of the job rank for the least skilled of the Destination 
population.  
 
Up to now, we have reasoned supposing that a given level of skills is equally valued at 
Origin and Destination. However, human capital obtained abroad may be less valued 
than domestically obtained human capital; hence, for a given job, employers require 
higher education from immigrants than from native workers. This may be due either to 
the fact that human capital acquired outside the host country provides less country-
specific skills, which reduces productivity and increases training costs, or to a lower 
quality of foreign schooling and of work experience. The wide literature on the 
“portability” of human capital acquired by immigrants in their country of origin suggest 
that  transferability is greater for countries that are highly developed or have a similar 
culture or language and lower for developing countries and those with more distant 
cultures (Chiswick, 1978; Friedberg, 2000).  This may imply a strong loss of status in 
the job position for migrants, with respect to the jobs available to them in their home 
country. This lost of status seems to be particularly important at the time of entrance in 
the destination labor market. However, there is disagreement among studies on whether 
this is a transitory situation of the job and income trajectories of migrants in the 
destination countries or constitutes a permanent situation of disadvantage (Bernardi et al 
2010; Obucina, 2011). 
A lower position in the queue of the destination labor market may also be the result of 
“ethnic penalty”, a concept used to describe immigrant residual disadvantage in the 
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 Resources may also include social capital acquired prior to migration. Migrant networks can, of course, 
diminish the costs of migration, by providing privileged access to employment. Therefore, the availability 
of networks at destination may especially increase the migration probabilities of the least skilled workers, 
that otherwise would not be able to compete in destination labor markets.  
7
 Job competition model was primarily conceived to explain labor market dynamics in advanced 
economies, and it is unclear wither it can be applied to contexts such as the contemporary Sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
labor market after controlling for their skills and other socio-demographic 
characteristics (Heath and Ridge, 1983). Different forms of discrimination towards 
foreigners
8
, in the form of segregation into low-quality and low paid jobs may play a 
role in explaining their higher over-education. In this case, it is unlikely to decrease 
with the duration of the migratory experience. At an equal level of education (or skills) 
individuals from the origin country are disadvantaged if they were to migrate to a 
particular destination country with a high “ethnic penalty”, thus discouraging migration. 
Furthermore, the higher the “ethnic penalty” of migrant workers, the more there will be 
a positive selection according to skills. 
 
The explanation advanced here of migration selectivity is also compatible with the 
existence of a dual labor market consisting of skilled and unskilled labor (Piore 1979;  
Bulow and Summers (1986), Davis and Reeve (1997), De Groot and Van Schaik (1997) 
and Davis (1998). Since only a limited number of jobs are available in both sectors
9
, an 
increased supply of skilled workers leads to full employment in the skilled sector, while 
the remaining skilled workers are temporarily hired in unskilled jobs. Hence, unskilled 
labor will be crowded out of the labor market into unemployment, for native workers, or 
into non-migration, for individuals from de origin country. Better skilled migrants will 
be able to access the secondary labor market of the receiving country, but they may 
have strong difficulties in accessing the primary positions. 
Finally, the mechanisms described above will severely limit the pool of potential 
migrants to economically advanced countries, by limiting the number of individuals 
with the required minimum level of skills to successfully compete in those labor 
markets. 
 
 
 
The upsurge of Senegalese migration to Europe (to be developed) 
 
Brief description of trends and flows to each country. 
Presentation of educational distributions. Job categories of Senegalese migrant workers. 
 
Most Sub-Saharan Africa countries, including Senegal, have experienced long periods 
of economic recessions and crises, including most of the 1980s and 1990s. Economic 
and human development has remained well behind other regions of the World (United 
Nations, 2009). Although the role of poverty in determining migration seems to be 
context specific (de Haas, 2009), income levels have remained well below to what is 
generally believed to lead to mass migration (Fini and Venturini, 2010). International 
historic experience show that migration accelerates in early phases of development, 
combined with parallel demographic transitions (Taylor, 1996). 
Responses of African governments and international organizations, such as the IMF, to 
bad economic performance have included structural adjustment programs and 
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 These include legal discrimination (e.g. non recognition of diplomas obtained abroad) as well as 
statistical discrimination. 
9
 Our approach coincides with the dual labor market theory in that labor market dynamics at destination 
is what determines the number of migrant workers. However, the dual labor market theory is basically 
silent concerning the qualifications of immigrants (especially with respect to the distribution of skills in 
the origin country) and labor market dynamics in the origin country. 
 
liberalization of the economy (e.g. Collier and Gunnig, 1999; Azam, 2004; Thioub, 
Diop, Boone 1998) . These policies, however, have not prevented the deterioration of 
living conditions for large fractions of the population and the increase of insecurity and 
social inequalities (Weissman, 1990). In such context, migration can be interpreted as a 
survival economic strategy by households  (Stark,1991; Scoones 1998; Barrett et al 
2001; Kothari 2002). Migration can thus be a way of accumulating human or physical 
capital, if access to credit is restricted. It is a means of protecting income stability, 
through the diversification of resources.  
 
 
Lifetime risks of migration from Senegal. MAFE survey 
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
lf
tr
is
k
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
xyear
lftrisk2 lftrisk1
 
 
 
Destination of migrants who left Dakar for their first time before 
1990 (%)
FRANCE; 35
COTE D'IVORY; 9
ITALY; 8
MAURITANIE; 8 US; 6 GABON; 6
CHINA; 4
MALI; 3
SPAIN; 3
GAMBIA; 2
MOROCCO; 2
GERMANY; 2
BELGIUM; 2
OTHERS; 10
 
Destination of migrants who left Dakar for their first time after 
1989 (%)
FRANCE; 25
ITALY; 21
SPAIN; 11 US; 9
MAURITANIA; 6
COTE D'IVORY; 3
GABON; 3
PORTUGAL; 2
SAUDI ARABIA; 2
GAMBIA; 2
MOROCCO; 2
MALI; 2
GUINEA; 2
SWITZERLAND; 1
 
 
 
 
Data 
 
The empirical analyses in this paper are based in the survey «Migrations between Africa 
and Europe» (MAFE-Senegal)
10
. This transnational dataset results from the collection 
of identical data both in European countries and in Senegal: 603 Senegalese migrants 
were surveyed in Europe (about 200 in each of the following countries: France, Italy 
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 The Senegalese part of the Migration between Africa and Europe (MAFE) project is coordinated by 
INED (C. Beauchemin), in association with the Université Cheikh Anta Diop (P. Sakho). The project also 
involves the Universitat Pompeu Fabra (P. Baizán), the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas 
(A. González-Ferrer), and the Forum Internazionale ed Europeo di Ricerche sull‟Immigrazione (E. 
Castagnone). The survey was conducted with the financial support of INED, the Agence Nationale de la 
Recherche, the Région Ile de France and the FSP programme 'International Migrations, territorial 
reorganizations and development of the countries of the South'. The MAFE-Senegal project is now being 
enlarged to Ghanaian and Congolese migrations, thanks to a funding from the European Community‟s 
Seventh Framework Programme under grant agreement 217206. For more information (including the 
questionnaires), see: http://www.mafeproject.com/ 
and Spain
11
) and 1,067 persons were interviewed in the region of Dakar (including 197 
returnees and 101 migrant‟s partners at the time of the survey, i.e. 2008). The places 
covered by the MAFE Senegal survey offer a good coverage of Senegalese migrants. 
On one hand, in Europe, France, Spain and Italy accounted for 45 percent of the 
international Senegalese migrants declared in the 2002 Senegal Census. On the other 
hand, the region of Dakar is home to about a quarter of the national population in the 
2002 Senegal Census and is the region of origin of 31% of the international migrants 
declared in 2001-2002 by Senegalese households in the ESAM-II survey. In all 
countries, the eligibility criteria for selection into the sample established that individuals 
had to be between 25 and 75 years of age (to have long enough life histories), born in 
Senegal (to exclude second generation in Europe) and of present or past Senegalese 
nationality (to exclude immigrants in Senegal). Varied sampling methods were used to 
select the individuals. In Senegal, a stratified probabilistic sample was drawn. The 
municipal register in Spain (Padrón) offered a national sampling frame from which 
documented and undocumented migrants could be randomly sampled. Respondents in 
France and Italy were sampled through varied non-probabilistic methods (e.g. 
snowballing, intercept points, contacts obtained from migrant associations) in order to 
fill pre-established quotas by sex and age. Additional information can be found in 
González-Ferrer and Beauchemin (2011) or on the website of the MAFE project: 
http://www.mafeproject.com/. 
The data are time-varying by nature, since they result from individual life-histories 
collected in biographical questionnaires. The questionnaire was designed to collect 
longitudinal retrospective information on a yearly basis from birth until the time of 
survey (2008), for each sampled individual, whatever his/her country of residence at the 
time of the survey. The data collected include a large range of information on migration 
and occupation histories of the interviewed persons, as well as on their family history 
(children, partnerships). Information on professional occupations have been coded into 
ISCO-08 International Labor Office classification, and subsequently collapsed into the 
International Socio-Economic Index of occupational status ISEI, (Ganzeboom & 
Treiman 1996; Ganzeboom, 2010), and the  Socio-Economic Status classification, EGP, 
(Eriksson, Golthorpe & Portocarrero classification. Eriksson, R. and Goldthorpe, J.H. 
1993). The questionnaire includes a whole module on the international migrations of the 
interviewee relatives (including his/her current and past partners), friends and 
acquaintances. Besides, it includes information on the individual earnings at the time of 
each activity period (each change in occupational category imply a separate activity 
period). Reported earnings have been deflated (base year 2000) and converted into 
Euros. International migration is defined as a stay of at least 12 months outside Senegal. 
In the present analyses we include exclusively direct migrations from Senegal to France, 
Italy, or Spain (we treat them as a single destination). 
 
 
Methods 
We use discrete-time event history techniques to analyze first migration from Senegal to 
France, Italy or Spain (Yamaguchi, 1991). The model is specified as a logistic 
regression: 
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 For the sake of simplicity in writing and reading, we‟ll refer in the rest of the text to “Europe” instead 
of mentioning these three different destination countries.  
 log[Pit / (1-Pit)] = α0 + β‟ Xit  
 
where Pit is the conditional probability that individual i experiences a first migration in 
year t. α is a constant term, and Xit   is a vector of covariates (including the baseline 
hazard function), with β denoting the value of the estimated coefficients of the model 
for each variable. This model estimates the effects on migration probabilities of a 
number of background characteristics of individuals. However, in the Borjas‟ (1987) 
model migration takes place when expected earnings, net of migration costs, in the new 
country are greater than in the source country. Individuals with the widest relative 
differential in earnings will show higher migration probabilities. Therefore, in order to 
compute the differential in earnings, in addition to observed earnings in Senegal (for 
non migrants) and observed earnings in Europe (for migrants), the relevant questions 
are “what non migrant individuals would earn if they had migrated?” and “how much 
migrants would earn had they stayed in Senegal?”. In order to provide answers to these 
questions we have computed the predicted labor income in Europe, taking into account 
selection into employment and being a migrant, and the predicted labor income in 
Senegal, taking into account selection into employment. The specification has taken the 
form of a system of equations for migration (event history logistic regression), work/no 
work (probit), labor income (OLS), in which we have included a residual terms specific 
to each individual interviewed (Lillard, L.A., 1993):  
 
Y*= α0 + β‟ Xit +εi 
Y*= α0 + β‟ Xit +δi 
Y*= α0 + β‟ Xit +ηi 
 
The heterogeneity terms ε, δ, and η and are assumed to follow a joint tri-variate normal 
distribution: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Once we have an estimate of the expected earnings for migrants and non migrants in 
both locations (Senegal and Europe) we can plug this information into the model for 
first migration, presented above. 
 
 
Results 
 
A first set of results depict migration selectivity according to several variables that are 
linked to skills and other individual‟s resources. In table 1 we present the effects of the 
educational level. These results are clearly significant and follow a sharp positive 
gradient, in which individuals with secondary education have a coefficient of 1.8 with 
respect to individuals with no schooling. The coefficient for tertiary educated 
individuals is 1.4, suggesting an inverted U shape in the effect of education (or rather an 
inverted and reversed J shape, as the tertiary educated show a much smaller decline). 
When we apply a continuous specification to education (years of schooling) the results 
2
2
2
,
0
0
0
~ N
also show a clear positive and significant gradient for education, although an additional 
parameter for the square of the years of education is not significant. It is instructive to 
remember that more than two thirds of the Senegalese population has a primary or 
lower level of education, for which the migration probabilities are particularly low. 
Furthermore, the Senegalese educational system (in particular, post primary education) 
provides literacy and language skills in French, likely facilitating job search and 
opportunities in France, Italy and Spain. 
In the models presented in tables 2 and 3, in addition to educational level, we included 
two indicators of the job position. The results pertaining to the EGP classification as 
well as the ISEI classification both show a clear inverted U shape, albeit skewed to the 
higher positions: i.e. this indicator also show a clear and strong positive selection of 
migrants. Individuals in the higher positions (e.g. managers, professionals, large 
proprietors) presumably would have important opportunity costs if they were to migrate 
to Europe (although they may also have larger absolute income gains; see below), 
compared to the intermediate categories that show higher migration probabilities 
(routine non manual workers, and to a lesser extent, skilled manual workers). Similar 
reflections apply to the effects of income, which show clearly positive and strong 
coefficients (0.041***; and the logarithm of income: 0.360**).  
 
 
Table 1. Dependent variable: first migration 
Age -0.470*** 
Ln age 12.518*** 
Woman -0.558 
No schooling (ref.)   
Primary schooling  0.501*  
Secondary  1.794***  
Tertiary  1.397***  
Controls: spouse in Europe, friends in Europe  
 
 
Table 2. Dependent variable: first migration 
Student  0.681 
Unemployed 0.417 
Other inactive  0.016  
Unskilled manual  -0.229  
Skilled manual(ref)  
Routine non manual  0.732*  
Higher occupations  -0.010  
Controls: age, lnage, gender, education, spouse in Europe, friends in Europe  
 
 Table 3. Dependent variable: first migration 
Student  0.450 
Unemployed 0.175 
Other inactive  -0.297  
ISEI  0.057**  
ISEI square -0.001*  
Controls: age, lnage, gender, education, spouse in Europe, friends in Europe  
 
 
A second step in our analysis involves the estimation of predicted wages in Senegal and 
Europe, and the net income gains of migration. As can be seen in table 4, the standard 
deviation of the heterogeneity components of the equations for migration, employment 
and earnings are significantly different from zero. In addition, the correlation between 
these heterogeneity components is positive and significant for the processes of 
migration and earnings, indicating that there are unmeasured factors that affect both 
processes. This positive correlation implies that the same unmeasured factors that favor 
migration also favor earnings at destination, and suggest a positive selection into 
migration according to skills. The correlation between the heterogeneity components of 
employment and earnings is also positive and significant, as expected. In the case of the 
processes of migration and employment no significant correlation is found. This may be 
the result of a strong selection into migration: only individuals with high probabilities of 
finding an employment in Europe would migrate. 
In table 5 we present the results on the predicted wages in Senegal and in Europe. The 
earnings profiles by education in Senegal is steeper than in Europe, indicating a greater  
pay off for education in Senegal
12
. This is the situation were the Borjas‟ model would 
predict a negative selection according to skills. Furthermore, predicted earnings for 
individuals with less than secondary school fall much below minimum wages in Europe. 
This implies very little probabilities of getting employment in Europe. As predicted by 
the job competition model presented above these individuals are the least likely to 
migrate. 
The application of the predicted wages in Europe to the analysis of the migration 
propensities shows once again that individuals with high earnings are more likely to 
migrate (Table 6). Contrary to the Borjas‟ model expectations, the difference in 
predicted earnings in relative terms (logarithmic scale) has a negative effect on 
migration (-1.7**), because individuals with low earnings have the widest relative 
income differential. Income differentials show that in percentage terms more educated 
workers do not do as well as low educated workers, but the difference in predicted 
earnings in absolute terms provides greater incentives for more educated to migrate 
(0.002**).  
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 The relatively low returns to education found for the Senegalese migrants in Europe is consistent with 
the fact that many of them work in the secondary sector of the labor market. High segregation of migrants 
in certain occupations is nevertheless coupled with little differences in wages with natives that occupy the 
same occupations holding similar characteristics such as age, sex, education, etc. (Reyneri, 2006; 
Bernardi et al, 2011). 
  
 
 
 
Table 4. Simultaneous equations for migration, employment, and income.  
Error structure 
 France, Italy, 
Spain 
Senegal 
Standard deviation ε  
migration  
1.043***   
Standard deviation δ  
employment  
1.752***  1.656***  
Standard deviation η 
income  
0.574***  0.809***  
Correlation ε  δ  -0.009   
Correlation  ε η  0.484**   
Correlation δ η  0.310***  0.216**  
 
 
Table 5. Results: earnings equations 
 France, Italy, 
Spain 
Senegal 
No schooling   
Some schooling  0.012 0.058 
Primary  0.147  0.235***  
Lower secondary  0.237*  0.329***  
Higher secondary 0.363**  0.778***  
Tertiary  0.624***  0.956***  
Controls: age, age square, gender 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Dependent variable: first migration 
Age -0.338*** -0.393*** 
Ln age 7.611*** 10.021*** 
Woman -0.697* -0.734* 
Log pr. income  1.534***   
Pred. income   0.001*  
Married  0.226  0.211  
Children  -0.184***  -0.195**  
Spouse in F,I,E  1.312***  1.336***  
Friends in F,I,E  1.950***  1.977***  
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